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LOGIC v. COMMON SENSE IN PLEADING 
The N ecessit)' of Fact-Pleading 
MICHIGAN'S experiment in pleading-or the suppression of pleading-is being carefully watched throughout the country. 
Not that it is likely that many other states will go 1.o the 
extreme, for it is an extreme, of substituting notice-pleading for 
essential-fact-pleading: but it is a fact that even the code states are 
experiencing a reaction in that general direction. It will probably 
lead to a. multiplication of their "short forms,'' rather than to a 
sweeping provision that 
"no declaration shall be deemed insufficient which shall con-
tain such information as shall reasonably inform the defend-
ant of the nature of. the case he is called upon to defend."1 
It is not entirely that they are unable to perceive the advantage of 
such freedom. Many of them have had long experiences with form-
less pleadings in municipal courts (from one of the greatest of 
which this very idea is taken) and in the courts of justices of the 
peace that preceded them. In criminal law they have, of course, 
be<.>n accustomed to the most general of general issues, one having 
the exact effect of the new Michigan general issue in civil actions, 
"a demand by the defendant of a trial of the matters set forth in 
the plaintiff's declaration."2 In procedure before quasi-judicial 
commissions they are becoming accustomed to various degrees of 
informality. Yet they have not taken kindly to the abolition of es-
sential-fact-pleading in ordinary civil cases.8 • 
The reason is not a mere love of perversity. A provision for some 
kind of fact-pleading seems essential. That is, the functions that 
have heretofore been served by fact-pleading in Anglo-American 
law must still be served somehow. \Ve may postpone the process 
to the time of the trial ; we may simplify it to the highest degree; 
we may leave it to be implied by the lawyers and the Court on the 
basis of their general knowledge: but somewhere, somehow, we must 
frame an issue in every dispute before the dispute can be decided. 
That the framing of an issue is the only function served by plead-
ings, I do not maintain. Pleadings have been used as a repository 
'The Judicature Act of 1915, ch. xiv, § 2, based on Rule 15 of the Chicago Municipal 
Court. 
: Ibid, § u. 
•Clarke Butler \Vhittier, Notice Pleading, 31 Harvard La"· Review, 501. 
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of evidence. They have been relied upon for the purpose of giving 
notice to an adversary of that on which he ·must be prepared at the 
time of trial. They have served the purpose of permanent and offi-
cial records of matters adjudicated or at least of summaries of that 
which happens from day to day in the courts. Incidentally, they 
have from time to time become the embodiment of the substantive 
law and have served the function of digests or codes, reversing the 
maxim "no right without a remedy," so as to limit one's rights by 
reference to his remedies. Under our jury system they have served 
the legitimate function of distinguishing between issues of fact and 
issues of law, and the questionable function of taking as many cases 
as possible away from the jury. At the same time, pleadings have 
served some less desirable purposes: they have developed technicali-
ties that have tended from time to time to encumber the administra-
tion of justice, or to thwart it, and they have served their part in 
the preservation of the monopoly in the handling of litigation for 
men of special training. Yet we should hardly lay down any of 
these secondary functions today as the ultimate purpose of pleading, 
any more than we should its incidental effect-to terrify freshmen. 
Still if anyone insists that the framing of an issue is not the all 
important aim of pleading, and urges the shaping of the future of 
pleading on the basis of any other function,4 I shall not quarrel with 
him provided he can give me a better name for whatever does serve 
this necessary function, which, at least in the common law of Eng-
land and ·America, has been served and is being served by written 
statements of the essential f<!-Gts on which a claim or a defense de-
pends. 
T7.oo Ideals of Pleading-In Theor:>' 
If we grant, however grudgingly, that some scheme of pleading, 
in this old sense, some mechanism by w4ich an issue mq.y be framed, 
is necessary, we still have a wide latitude of choice among devices 
offered to us, on the one hand by logic and on the other by common 
sense. 
• I am aware of a tendency, especially in Michigan, to regard the giving of notice 
as the mo~t important function of pleading. "The purpose of pleading," says a Michigan 
court, "is to enable the defendant to prepare his defense." Malloy v. Grand Trunk Ry. 
Co., 158 N. \V. 854, 855. Cf. Edson R. Sunderland in 14 Michigan Law Review 552, 
where the distinction between the notice-giving and issue-framing functions is recognized. 
Professor Whittier has declared (4 lllinois Law R<oview 178) and Dean Pound has quoted 
with approval (ib. 495): "The chief object of pleading [is] to notify the parties respec-
tively of the claims or defenses which will be advanced by their opponents and attempted 
to be proved at the trial." It is suggested, with deference, that while procedural reform 
based on this principle may be timely, for reasons stated below, the principle itself can· 
not be accepted without qualifications as to time and place. 
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There is a tendency today to minimize the importance of the logic 
element and to emphasize the common sense of the situation and 
possibly to go to extremes in the name of common sense. The Mich-
igan experiment, I believe, is but one of many manifestations of this 
tendency. It is not limited to the ranks of the lawyers who have 
become sated with the idiosyncrasies of a rigid set of rules. There 
is little doubt as to how a group of intelligent laymen would react 
to the following questions (I have tried them on freshmen): Should 
a man's theory of his case be tried or should a decision ·be rendered 
on the merits? On the merits, of course. Should his words be in-
terpreted strictly against him or liberally, so as to do substantial 
justice between the parties? This question is hardly worth answer-
ing. Should the pleadings control the evidence or should the evi-
dence be made the basis of a shaping or reshaping of the pleadings? 
It is an insult to the intelligence of the twentieth century to suggest 
that pleadings should keep out essential facts, for the presentation 
of which they are only as a means to an end. Should ordinary and 
concise language be the ideal of the pleader, or should words of art 
be carefully used and required in appropriate places? Words of art 
are, of course, consigned to perdition along with the Latin of the 
physician's prescription. Should a man be compelled to classify his 
case, and to proceed in accordance with the rules recognized in cases 
of a particular class, or should he leave the process to the tribunal 
and run no risk of selecting the wrong weapon from the arsenal of 
the law? Classification is but the shell of the law of yesterday-the 
living law of today must cast it off if it is to grow. If a man really 
has two possible defenses or two possible theories on either of which 
he may succeed, shall he be forced to choose one at the outset and 
stand or fall by it? Full justice, of course, requires the ventilation 
of every possible theory. In short, the ideal of common sense in 
pleading needs no recommendation, at least as matters now stand. 
A little cross-examination, however, may check some of the testi-
mony of our lay-witnesses. \.Vould they go so far ~s to force a man 
without any previous notice to prove in court a matter that had n()t 
been questioned in the pleadings? Hardly-some arrangement must 
be made to avoid that extreme. Would they encourage "sloppy'" 
pleading, bearing in mind how easily that may be degenerated into 
tricky pleading? Of course not. On the whole, are not certainty and 
directness to be preferred to obscurity and prolixity in pleading? 
Yes, provided the price paid is not too high. Would they permit a 
man who had used a technical expression as a weapon to hide be-
hind a "Pickwickian sense" when he finds that technicality working 
out to his own disadvantage? That, of course, would be unfair. In 
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view of the complicated nature of human relations, aren't technical 
expressions, words of art, quite necessary for the purpose of exact 
definition of issues? Certainly. We should hardly write a treatise 
on chemistry without technical terms-why then a presentation of 
human relations? Surely a man who wishes to make use of the pub-
lic courts either for offense or defense ought to be held to a strict 
accountability with reference to the court's time. vVhy shouldn't 
he be expected to find out in advance exactly what he wants and on 
what basis he claims it? Undoubtedly there is much to be said in 
favor of such a demand, but the question of how strictly one should 
be limited to the theory he selects, is a question of degree. 
The Two Ideals in History 
Thus gradually the case against the non-logical ideal may be weak-
ened though by no means broken down. At least, there are two sides 
to the case. There are two ideals--constantly struggling with each 
other, yielding now an inch on this side and now an inch on that, 
but neither beaten in the contest. In the light of this struggle .the 
whole history of pleading, at least in Anglo-American law, may be 
reinterpreted. It then becomes an intelligible and even a fascinating 
account of two tendencies in human nature ; a spirit is breathed into 
the dry rules of pleading and they live. 
The conflict between these two ideals, logic and common sense. 
between certainty and justice, is old-very old. It is not limited to 
Anglo-American law. Its universality and continuity have frequent-
ly been observed, but generally only to illustrate a single line of de-
velopment, the gradual emancipation of substantive law from the 
shackles of adjective law. The extent of this emancipation in any 
particular society is therefore taken as a reiiable measure of its 
progress. In fact, what I have here called the struggle between two 
ideals becomes the struggle of but one· ideal against the forces of 
darkness, and the history of enlightenment becomes a history of 
the triumph of substance over form. The idea has been common 
since the days of Sir Henry Maine. 
"So great." says he, "is the ascendancy of the Law of Ac-
tions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive 
law hac; at first the look of being gradually secreted in the 
interstices of Procedure."5 
• Earlv Law and Custom, 389. The same idea is expressed in Early History of In· 
stitutions, 
0
252. Cf. Holmes, The Common Law, 253: ''Whenever we trace a legal doctrine 
of substantive Jaw far enough back, we are likely to find some forgotten circumstance of 
procedure at its source." 
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In general, we are told, "legal technicality is a disease not of old 
age, but of the infancy of societies." In a very general way this 
theory is borne out by a comparison of medireval and modern pro-
cedure. In early law it was fatal to a man's case to fail to "defend 
the words which ought to be defended." Such substantive law as 
has come down to us from early times has been preserved by cling-
ing to parts of adjective law for dear life. No doubt the subsequent 
history of the law of rights has been greatly affected by the nature 
of the procedural law to which it is attached. Still it is going a 
little too far to suppose that in the first instance rights were created 
by remedies. At most procedure may have hardened custom into 
law, but the relations presupposed in the customs are human rela-
tions, made not in the courts but in every-day life. Crystallized 
codes of procedure are the results of a process of development just 
as crystallized rules of substantive law are, and in the process of 
their development they are influenced by the substantive law per-
haps even more than the substantive law is influenced by them. 
Remedies may become defined and crystallized more quickly than 
rights, and may then exercise a retarding influence on the develop-
ment of rights.0 Yet too much has been said of late about the form-
ative influence of procedure and not enough about the manner in 
which procedure reflects and is subservient to the substantive law 
of the times. 
The simplicity of the old explanation of a continuous progress 
from adjective to substantive law is alluring-but it is a will-of-the-
wisp. It is really futile to try to determine whether the formality 
of early law preceded substantive notions, or whether they them-
selves were preceded by a substratum of informal law. This much 
is clear: human nature, on its intellectual side has driven us to form-
ality, the instrument of logic and certainty, and inertia has fre-
quently kept us going in that direction beyond the point approved 
by common sense. The evil has generally brought with it its own 
remedy. A reaction has set in, in which another side of human na-
ture has revolted against the dictates of formal logic. At a certain 
point the reaction itself is checked and a development in the opposite 
direction is begun again. 
One may wonder how, in a matter requiring the highest mental 
capacities, a depreciation of logic can be tolerated at any time. Yet 
such is the case not only in pleading but also in other branches of 
the law. Take that remarkable volume of ultra-modem essays on 
• Charles McGuffey Hepburn, Historical Development of Code Pleading in America 
and England, 31. 
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The Science of Legal Method,1 and consider the impression it has 
made on the mind of a logician. 
""What strikes a logician as most curious is that this move-
ment of challenge and reconstruction should take the form 
of an attack on 'logic.' There is surely a strange paradox 
here, is there not? * * * Geny recommends the lawyer to 
realize that the elements of every system of positive law 'are 
not logical entities, but those ethical and economic realities 
which alone can give us an insight into the effective forces of 
social life' (page 42). Ehrlich, after his fashion, is refresh-
ingly vigorous: 'Of all the gifts of the human intellect, logical 
acumen is the least fruitful. There is profound wisdom in 
the fact that German legend frequently portrays the devil as 
a sharp dialectician' (page 84). Gmelin inveighs against 
those who 'care everything for formal logic and nothing for 
the sense of justice' (page 140). Kiss contrasts the Roman 
idea of 'aequitas' which kept the interpretation of the law 
plastic, with the 'degenerate' scholastic application of it by 
•formal dialectic logic' (page 154 et seq.). Berolzheimer calls 
for emancipation from 'the letter of the law' (page 167). 
Such an authority as Dean Pound decalres 'application of 
law must involve not logic merely but a measure of discretion 
as well,' and he adds that the law cannot be made 'purely me-
chanical in its operation' (page 208). ·wurzel records the 
appearance at the present time of the postulate that juridical 
thinking is 'to have even the courage of being illogical' (page 
297)." 
And so in pleading, too, there appears at this particular time a 
desire to get away from logical formul~. It must not be supposed, 
however, that this is the first time in the history of mankind that 
vent has been given to such feelings as these. The entire modern 
history of pleading, between the Year Books and the modern codes, 
has been filled with a struggle to tone down the harshnesses of that 
rigidly logical system that grew up in the Year Books. In the realm 
of substantive lai.v this attitude produced Equity. In pleading it 
produced v<i.rious devices by which, illogically to be sure, a pleader 
was permitted to put more than one point in issue. That is the his-
torical significance of the General Issue and the Replication de 
injuria-and numerous other deviations from the strictly logical 
plan of mediGeval pleading. Indeed many of the most difficult, most 
~Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Volume 9, Boston, 1917. l quote below from the 
remarkable re\•iew by R. F. Alfred Hoernle, in 31 Harvard Law Review 807. 
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unreasonable, most technical provisions that have made a chimera 
of common law pleading are these very concessions to common sense. 
In the beginning Qf the nineteenth century the most marked defect 
in common law pleading was not its injustice but its irregularity, not 
its narrowness but its cumbersomeness, not its strictness but its un-
certainty. As I read the Hilary Rules of the fourth year of 'William 
IV, it seems that what the judges were attempting to accomplish by 
. virtue of the authority vested in them by Parliament, was to sweep 
away these irregularities, to simplify, codify, and make certain the 
rules to be followed by the pleader. On this side of the Atlantic 
the same desire for certainty was at least one of the elements in the 
complex mass of motives that made for pleading reform. Simplifi-
cation was the keynote both of codification and of the other modifica-
tions to which common law pleading was subjected. It is true there 
was also a desire to prevent the miscarriage of justice that technical 
pleading had so often produced. But this last motive was probably 
stronger among the people than in the profession itself. The conse-
quence has been that the courts have generally construed the code 
as a reenactment of so much of common law pleading as was not 
absolutely inconsistent with its terms. In course of time the codes 
have been interpreted and reinterpreted-as all codes are. Every 
word has been subjected to the pro.:ess of glossation. Logical con-
clusions have been spun from the very commas in the code so that 
today in the code states logic seems to have the upper hand in the 
contest with common sense. The popular desire, always on the 
side of common sense, seems however to be winning over profes-
sional opinion as a reaction-and this, rather than the success of 
the squire's court's methods, is the explanation of the attempt today 
to do away with all fact-pleading. 
The True Significance of the Present Trend 
The situation is exactly like that which develops in the history of 
codes in other branches of law.8 Constitutional law, for example, 
the first part of our law to be codified in this country, has gone 
through a period of verbal interpretation that seems to be passing 
• I have traced 'this post-mortem history of codes in several connections in 65 Uni· 
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 665, 31 Harvard Law Review 373, 27 Yale Law 
Journal 31. A close parallel could be drawn in the history of pleading showing alterna· 
tions between periods of strict law and periods of equity, with the se\•eral transitional 
stages. It is enough for our present purposes, however, to note that Anglo-American 
pleadings have twice in history been reduced to something like a rigid code, sufficiently 
definite in letter to make the spirit secondary. The first we may date sometime in the 
1400s, perhaps a generation or two before the publication of the Lioer Intratiomnn, .1510. 
The other is the period of re,·isions and codes about the middle of the nineteenth century. 
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away before a new spirit of realism. The newer codes, on the other 
hand, are just entering into their periods of word quibbles. The 
decisions, for example, on the Negotiable Instruments and the Sales 
codes have degenerated in the last few years into quarrels as to 
whether the word "value" means one thing or another in a certain 
place, and whether the back of an instrument is really the back of 
it. In passing, it may be encouraging to remember that this is but 
a transitory phase of statutory interpretation, and that we may hope 
in course of time for a reaction against this particular kind of logic 
in these fields. 
·when the reaction finally sets in there is apt to be a feeling on the 
part of those who take part in it that they are really independent of 
the narrow past. As a matter of fact, the habits of thinking formed 
in that narrow past are not so easily shaken off. We are just begin-
ning to learn how much of the equity of the chancellors was really 
a reflection of the strict law of earlier times. Equity follows the law 
in more !.'enses than one. In like manner those who today declare 
their independence of ancient rules of pleading may be enabled to do 
so largely by reason of the general habit of implying what that older 
pleading had expressed. Here, I believe, we have a true explanation 
of the success in Michigan at the present day of notice-pleading, a 
system by the way for which Michigan courts had prepared the way 
before the adoption of the Judicature Act of 1915. We must remem-
ber that those little names of types of cases, "assumpsit," "trespass 
on the case," and so on, tell us a great part of a man's story. If a 
code-state \vere to try noti7e-pleading, it would soon find itself handi-
capped by the lack of them. As matters stand the defendant, the 
judge, the jury, the lawyers, everybody knows by implication, what 
is meant when a traction company is sued by an injured pedestrian 
for damages. They know that negligence is the basis of the alleged 
liability, and they know, as a matter of .fact, almost everything that 
goes to make up the average case of this variety. In like manner 
in all of the commonest forms of cases that fill our courts, a little 
imagination is sufficient to enable us to supply, out of our experience 
with past cases, the framework of the entire transaction. But there 
are also unusual cases, and those that are usual today may be less 
usual as civilization progresses and life changes. The very same 
considerations that have made it necessary to struggle away from 
the fixed forms of pleading of the past will surely make it necessary 
to do something to fill in the gaps of a system of pleading which is 
adequate for today only, because based on implications which we 
inherit from the immediate past and which are valid for only the 
peculiar factc;; of today. 
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Jn one sense a system of pleading is to be judged solely by its 
usefulness for the time being. It is a means to an end. When the 
need arrives, the advocates of notice-pleading may tell us, a more 
elaborate pleading can easily be developed. "The forms of declara-
tion now in common use" may still be employed.9 But it is all a 
question of degree. To what extent is it desirable-or even safe-
to conceal or deny the process of the framing of an issue? To what 
extent should be deliberately worked out before the trial; to what 
extent should it be left to the judge at the trial or after the trial ?10 
There is a danger line somewhere, and the further we go beyond 
it, the more violent will be the reaction, in the opposite direction. 
The Cru:i: of the Matter-Common Sense and !ttdici.al Freedom 
Whether desirable or not it is hardly likely that experimentation 
in the neighborhood of the danger line will be permitted to the 
courts in many of our states. There is a practical consideration that 
seems likely to cut short the career of common sense in pleading 
long before the danger line is reached in this country. It is the 
jealousy of the power of officers that inheres in a democratic govern-
ment. Jn the final analysis the common sense ideal is inextricably 
interwoven with the extension of the discretion of the court, espe-
cially the trial court. Distrust of courts on the other hand, on the 
part of our legislatures not only gives proceedings in error their 
lease on life, but also becomes the fountain head of mechanical legis-
lative rules that must be mechanically applied. It may be good to 
talk about a freer interpretation of the law by the courts-they will 
•Judicature Act of 1915, ch. xiv, § "· 
1
• Is a judgment based on factless pleadings entitled to "full faith and credit" under 
the Constitution of the United States, in a sister state? In passing on foreign judgments 
it has frequently been held that to constitute a judgment there must be pleadings, moni-
tion and a bearing. (Sawyer v. Insurance Co., 12 Mass. 291 and other cases in Beale's 
Ca;es in Co11f!ict of Laws, HI, 294 ff.) Executive judgments, judgments by commissions, 
entries to which a statute gives the effect of judgments, and similar near-judgments 
arc, of course, not in~luded in the purview of this constitutional clause. (Foote v. 
Newell, 29 Mo. 400; Nouvion v. Freeman, IS App. Cases I.) That a similar weakness 
inheres in judgments where too much freedom is allowed in the shaping and reshaping 
of issues at :ind after the trial, is illustrated in Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254-
There Brewer, J., speaking for the court says: "The invalidity of the judgment depends 
upon the fact that it is in r.o manner responsive to the issues tendered by the pleadings. 
This idea underlies all litigation. Its emphatic language is, that a judgment, to be 
conclusive upon the parties to the litigation, must be responsive to the matters contro-
verted. * " * \Vben a r.omplaint tenders one cause of action, and in that suit service on, 
or appearance of, the defendant is made, a subsequent judgment therein, rendered in 
the absence o: the defendant, upon another and different cause of action than that stated 
in the complaint, is without binding force within the courts ~f the same state; and, ot 
course, notwithstanding the constitutional provision heretofore quoted, has no better 
standir.g in the courts of another state." 
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soon enough be reminded that freedom in interpretation is a viola-
tion of their oath of office. ''What the professors coolly propose to 
the judges" says an irate practitioner, "is the commission of im-
peachable offenses."11 This is the crux of the matter: Legislatures 
must learn that only in so far as they are wining to give a wide 
range of discretion to trial courts, can logic be made to yield to 
common sense in pleading. If they have the will to do it the means 
can easily be found. An infusion of common sense into pleading 
may come by granting or confirming a free rule-making power in 
the courts as has been done in England.12 It may come through such 
legislation as we are getting in some of the code states to prevent 
reviews and reversals in higher courts on pleading questions.111 It 
may come through a withdrawal by act of the legislature of all 
formal requirements in pleadings-or through a combination of all 
of these plans as in Michigan. But it cannot come any more rapidly 
or thoroughly or endure more permanently than the emancipation of 
the judiciary from the jealousy of the legislature even in an age 
when the tendency is all towards the reign of common sense. 
NATHA:N" ISAACS. 
Cincinnati Law School. 
ll John Maxey Zane, in 16 Michigan Law Review, 309. 
12 I need hardly refer to the Studies in English Civil Procedure by Samuel Rosen-
baum in 63 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, or his book, The Rule :Making Au· 
thority in the English Supreme Court, 1917. 
13 The American codes contained a provision to that effect. Thus: "The court, in 
every stage of an action, must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceed-
ings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment 
shall be reversed, or afftcted, by reason of such error or defect." ( § 138 of the code as 
adopted in Ohio, 1853). This was one of the sections that fared badly at the hands of 
the courts. All errors were presumed to be prejudicial. In 1911 Ohio added to this 
section of the code the following language: "In the judgment of any reviewing court 
upon any petition in error in any civil action, when it is sought to reverse any final 
judgment or decree or obtain a new trial upon the· issues joined in the pleadings, such 
reviewing court shall certify on its journal whether or not in its opinion substantial jus· 
tice has been done the party complaining, as shown by the record of the proceedings, 
and judgment under review. In case such reviewing court shall determine and certify 
that in its opinion substantial justice has been done to the party complain;ng as shown 
by the record, all alleged errors occurring at the trial shall by such re,•iewing court be 
deemed not prejudicial to the party complaining and shall be disregarded and such judg· 
ment or decree under review shall be affirmed, or it shall be modified if in the opinion 
of such reveiwing court a modification thereof will ·do more complete justice to the 
"arty complaining. In case such reviewing court shall determine and certify that in its 
opinion substantial justice has not been done to the party complaining as shown by the 
record such reviewing court shall proceed as provided in Section 12272 of the General 
Code." (General Code, Section I 1364.) 
That there i> a tendency now to respect the spirit of this provision may be seen in 
almost any volume of the recent decisions of a code state. For example, refusals to 
grant reversals for errors on the ground that they are not prejudicial are recorded in 87 
Ohio State at pages 401, 460, 477 and 479. 
